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Valuing Conflicting Public 
Information About a New 
Technology: The Case of 
Irradiated Foods 
Matthew C. Rousu and  Jason F. Shogren 
Scientists and advocates can disagree on the value of new products or technologies, 
such as  growth hormones, genetically modified organisms, and food irradiation. Both 
sides of the debate disseminate information to the public hoping to influence public 
opinion. This  study  assesses  the  economic value  of  both  pro  and anti public 
information using food irradiation as a case study. The value of information sources 
is estimated in isolation and in combination. In isolation, the results indicate each 
set of  information has value. In combination, only the anti-irradiation information 
is found  to have  net positive  value  (persuading some  consumers to  purchase 
non-irradiated products). Pro-irradiation information worked to decrease the value 
of anti-irradiation information by 68% per person. 
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Introduction 
Throughout history, some people accept and others reject novel technologies (see, e.g., 
Landes, 1969;  Postrel, 1999).  Such controversies extend to food product technologies. In 
the 1900s,  pasteurization was received with mixed support (Pirtle, 1926).  Today, people 
disagree about whether food products should be genetically engineered to increase 
productivity  or treated with irradiation to reduce foodborne pathogen  risk.'  Many 
individuals hold strong  pro or con views toward these controversial products and  expend 
resources disseminating public information in an  attempt to influence opinion.  Although 
groups commonly present opposing viewpoints to the general public, to date, scarce 
research exists that assesses the net value of this conflicting information based on how 
consumers switch their preferences. Understanding the value of information is useful 
because it  indicates to policy makers and the interested parties the net effectiveness of 
their information. 
Using experimental auction data from Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (20021, and Hayes, 
Fox, and Shogren (20021,  this paper estimates the value of conflicting  information about 
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'  Irradiation is the process of  treating products  to a dose of  radiation to kill harmful bacteria like Trichinella and 
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irradiated food  product^.^ This paper specifically contributes to the literature by going 
beyond the basic comparative static on how new information affects bidding behavior- 
we model and estimate the net value of  information from pro- and anti-irradiation 
groups when presented in isolation and in combination. Both sides of the debate believe 
their information has value if it changes consumer behavior. When presented in isola- 
tion, the results suggest both pro- and anti-irradiation information have value. When 
presented in combination, however, only the anti-irradiation information is found to 
have net positive value. 
Background: Estimating the Value of Information 
Several experimental valuation studies have examined the effects  of  information on 
bidding behavior (see Lusk et al., 2005; Fox, Hayes, and Shogren, 2002). For example, 
Hayes, Fox, and Shogren (2002) examine "how favorable and unfavorable information 
about food-irradiation technology affects willingness-to-pay to control" foodborne path- 
ogens. Few studies, however, have assessed the value of  information as revealed by 
consumer decisions to switch products. Our study seeks to fill this void by using the 
unique data developed by Hayes, Fox, and Shogren to estimate explicitly the value of 
information (which they did not do in their original workL3 
Foster and Just (1989)  examined how news of insecticide contamination affects milk 
consumption in Hawaii. They calculated the value of  government information as the 
difference in rational consumers' choices under incomplete and more complete informa- 
tion, which translated into approximately $10 per person per month. Using the same 
model, Teisl, Bockstael, and Levy (2001)  estimated the  value of information on nutrition 
labels and found that households valued the nutritional information, on average, from 
$0.096 to $0.542 per product each month. 
Huffman et al. (2003) and Rousu et al. (2004 and forthcoming) used the Foster and 
Just  (1989)  method as  a starting  point when they valued information on GM foods using 
experimental auctions. Investigating how preferences of different groups of consumers 
varied based on whether they received information, the authors reported that informa- 
tion on GM foods was worth several cents per product to auction participants, resulting 
in a potentially large social value. 
Our approach is similar to Rousu et al. (2004),  but with three key differences. First, 
the  participants were initially endowed with a non-irradiated pork sandwich and bid to 
upgrade to an irradiated pork sandwich. This contrasts with previous research which 
Irradiated foods provide an excellent case study of conflicting  information.  Pro-irradiation groups contend that irradiation 
reduces the annual cases offoodborne  illness without posing any additional risks (Centers  for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2005; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2005). Anti-irradiation groups argue that irradiation has few additional benefits 
to warrant the serious health risks arising from irradiating food (Pure-food.com,  2005). 
One can better appreciate our expanded contribution by comparing the tables in Hayes, Fox, and Shogren (2002) and 
those presented here. In their table 1, Hayes, Fox, and Shogren examine the "effect of  information on relative safety 
estimates,"  while the approach used in our table 1  is to examine the "percentage  of consumers who would switch purchases, 
and the value of  information."  Thus, useful new information is provided here about switching behavior, which is the key for 
estimating the value of  information. While many consumers would  have different willingness to pay for products &r 
receiving information, not all would change their purchasing decisions in a conventional market setting. This change in 
purchasing decisions, in combination  with the bids and the estimates for the market prices, allows us to estimate a value of 
information-a  factor not addressed in previous studies. In further comparison, table 2 in Hayes, Fox, and Shogren assesses 
the "effect of new information"  using an ordered probit model, whereas our table 2 looks at  what characteristics would cause 
a consumer to switch purchases in a conventional market setting. Once again, this distinction  matters, because the consumers 
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valued information in auctions where participants bid on separate products in separate 
rounds without any initial end~wment.~  Second, participants place bids to upgrade to 
the non-irradiated pork sandwich both before and after receiving information. This 
approach allows us to determine the  value of information for each participant who gains 
value, and provides valuable information unobtainable in previous studies that esti- 
mated only the number of participants who gained value because different participants 
received different information treatments. Third, this study is determining the value of 
conflicting scientific information from multiple sources. Specifically, each source has 
opposing views on irradiation, but each views a change in behavior by consumers caused 
by their information as  havingvalue to the  consumer, and to the group. Thus, the  value 
of conflicting scientific information must be identified amidst this clash of words. 
Data 
Data for this study are derived from the experimental auctions reported in Fox, Hayes, 
and Shogren (2002), and Hayes, Fox, and Shogren (2002),  who focused on the effects of 
conflicting information and not the value of  information. Their papers provide the 
complete description of  the experimental design, which we briefly summarize here. 
Eighty-seven adult participants were recruited from a random sample of 200 house- 
holds from Ames, Iowa. These participants placed bids in a Vickrey second-price  auction 
(Vickrey, 1961) to exchange a non-irradiated pork sandwich for an irradiated pork 
sandwich. This was a repeated trial auction, as each participant bid on the sandwich in 
10 different rounds. 
All participants received baseline information, distributed before the first round of 
bidding, describing irradiation and Trichinella, a foodborne pathogen. After the  first five 
rounds concluded,  participants received additional information on irradiation. The exact 
wording of  the two information sets can be found in Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002). 
Pro-irradiation materials were distributed containing information from the American 
Council on Science and Health. This information stressed how  irradiation could be 
useful in destroying bacteria; noted that  the process has  been approved by the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, the American Medical Association, and the World Health 
Organization; and stated that irradiation can save lives. The anti-irradiation informa- 
tion was provided by Food and Water, Inc., a consumer advocacy group. These materials 
emphasize how products are dosed with radiation, how irradiation might cause cancer 
or decrease nutrient content, how proper cooking eliminates threats from food in the 
same manner as irradiation, and state that irradiation is controlled by for-profit 
enterprises. 
Eighteen participants received pro-irradiation information  only;  19 participants 
received anti-irradiation information only; and 50 participants received both the pro- 
and anti-irradiation information. This experimental design is ideal for estimating the 
value of  public information both in isolation  and when opposing viewpoints  exist 
simultaneously. 
'  Experimental auctions that endow participants with products have many differences from non-endowment  auctions.  For 
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Modeling the Value of Information in a Clash of Words 
Consider the method used to value information in an exchange auction. We use an ex 
post approach where the consumers' behavior is examined after receiving information 
and it is assumed this is their "informed" behavior. Then this behavior is compared to 
the consumers' uninformed behavior before receiving information to determine  whether 
they behaved differently. Such information can also have an ex ante value if it causes 
a bid to be raised or lowered by an individual relative to the non-informed bid, even if 
there was no observable ex post change in behavior. 
Examining the difference in consumer surplus to attain the value of  information, 
while potentially useful when examining the introduction of new goods (e.g., see Lusk 
et al., 2005), does not provide what we define as a "corrective" value of information in 
our ex post model-i.e.,  the person made the wrong ex ante choice of  good, and, once 
informed, now makes the "correct" choice of  the other good. This is because we assume 
the post-information behavior is the "correct" behavior; that is, the new information 
allows individuals to "correct" their previously uninformed choice. Thus, even if con- 
sumers  have higher consumer surplus when informed, they do not value the  information 
as a  "corrective" instrument because  they  did  not  purchase  a  different  product. 
Similarly, information could alter consumers' demand for a product, but if there is no 
change in purchasing behavior, the information does not have "corrective" value in this 
model. However, the question of  examining ex ante value is beyond the scope of this 
paper. This value of information is estimated through the eyes of the group providing 
the information-as  any change in behavior would be perceived as valuable to the 
consumer. 
To determine the  value of information, we first estimate whether a participant would 
purchase the irradiated or the non-irradiated product. For simplicity and to follow the 
structure of the auction market that was used, it is assumed all consumers purchase 
either  the  irradiated sandwich or the non-irradiated sandwich, but not both. Participant 
j would purchase the irradiated sandwich when: 
BUY-IRJ  = 1  if BidJ - Prem 2 0. 
Alternatively, participant j  would purchase the non-irradiated sandwich when: 
(2)  BUY-NON-IRJ  = 1  if BidJ - Prem < 0. 
As  shown by  equations (1)  and (2), when participant j's  bid to exchange the non- 
irradiated sandwich for the  irradiated sandwich is greater than or equal to the premium 
(Prem)  for the irradiated sandwich, the participant purchases the irradiated sandwich. 
The premium is the additional amount the consumer would have to pay for the irradi- 
ated sandwich in a conventional market. In this analysis, the market premium for the 
irradiated sandwich is estimated to be $0.30 (a  15%  premium above a $2 market price).5 
When participant j's  bid to upgrade to the irradiated sandwich is less than the market 
premium, the  irradiated sandwich is  not purchased (instead,  participantj  purchases the 
The authors' anecdotal evidence suggests this premium approximates what can be found in grocery stores. For a sensi- 
tivity analysis, we  also examined the value of  information using both bigger  and smaller premiums for the irradiated 
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non-irradiated sandwich). Determining what the consumer  would purchase is important, 
because it signals when a consumer would switch purchases. Consumers only gain value 
from information if their consumption changes after receiving information. 
When would information on irradiated food products cause consumer  j to switch 
purchases? There are two ways information influences a consumer to switch. First, 
information could cause a consumer who was purchasing the non-irradiated sandwich 
before receiving information to purchase the irradiated sandwich after receiving infor- 
mation, as shown by equation (3): 
SWITCH-IR~=I  if BW-IR~,,~~  = 0,  and  BW-IR~~~~-~~~~  = I. 
Consumers would be most likely to switch to the  irradiated sandwich if they receive pro- 
irradiation  information. Consumers who receive both pro- and anti-irradiation informa- 
tion, however, might also switch to the irradiated sandwich. 
The second scenario under which consumers could switch purchases is if they had 
chosen to purchase the  irradiated sandwich before receiving information, but then 
decided to purchase the non-irradiated sandwich after receiving information, as shown 
by equation (4): 
(4)  SWITCH-NON-IR;='  if BW-IR~~~-~~~~  = 1, and  BW_IR:~~~-~~~~  = 0. 
Consumers would be most likely to switch to the  non-irradiated sandwich if they receive 
anti-irradiation information. Consumers who receive both pro- and anti-irradiation 
information might also switch to the non-irradiated sandwich. If consumer j  switches 
purchases after receiving information, the information has value to the consumer 
(through the eyes of the scientific group providing the information). To assess the  value 
to consumers, we must establish the difference in consumer surplus yielded from pur- 
chasing one product relative to purchasing the other. 
Because we obtain the consumer's bid to exchange the non-irradiated sandwich for 
the irradiated sandwich, the consumer's demand for both the irradiated and non-irradi- 
ated sandwich is unknown. The bid represents the  consumer's relative preference for the 
irradiated sandwich  [i.e., by  how much does the consumer prefer the irradiated (or 
non-irradiated) sandwich relative to the alternative]. The consumer surplus for each 
product cannot be determined, as that would require a bid for each product separately. 
However, by comparing the relative preference for the irradiated sandwich to the market 
price, the "relative consumer surplus" for these products can be established, which is 
adequate for determining the value of information. The relative consumer surplus for 
the irradiated version of a product is a relative consumer "deficit" for the non-irradiated 
version: 
(5)  Consumer- surplus^ =  I WTPj - Prem 1. 
The relative consumer surplus  is  the absolute difference between consumerj's willing- 
ness to pay (WTP) and the premium for the irradiated sandwich. If consumer j would 
purchase the irradiated sandwich, that individual's WTP is higher than the market 
price premium. Conversely, if consumer  j would purchase the non-irradiated sandwich, 
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a nonnegative relative consumer surplus (because they purchase the products they 
 refer),^ the  surplus  only represents the  value of information when a consumer switches 
 product^.^ 
It is useful to measure two different welfare gains. The first is the average welfare 
gain to a person whogains value from information (i.e., those who switched purchases): 
C  ~onsumer-Surplusj 
(6)  Value-Switchers  = jcsWitchd 
~switchers 
The average value of information to an  individual who gains value is  just the  total value 
of information divided by the  number of people who gained value from that information. 
The second welfare gain to  be measured is  the  average welfare gain to a person in  the 
population (regardless of whether they switched or not): 
C  Consumer-Surplusj 
(7)  Value- Person  = 
jcswitched 
N  population 
Because this experimental design used repeated trials, we have pre- and post-informa- 
tion bids from each participant, which allows us to determine exactly who gained some 
value from information.' 
Results 
The Value of  Information in Isolation 
First, we consider the impact of information when the sources are not competing with 
each other (i.e., each information source is presented without the dissenting informa- 
tion). Following Fox, Hayes, and  Shogren (2002), we used round 5  (bid  immediately prior 
to receiving information) and round 6 (bid immediately after receiving information) for 
this analysis. 
Panel A of table 1  shows the percentage of participants who would purchase the 
irradiated sandwich in the  treatment receiving only pro-irradiation information. Before 
the  pro-irradiation information on irradiation is  disseminated, 39%  of consumers would 
purchase the irradiated sandwich. Once pro-irradiation information is disseminated, 
17%  of the  group would switch their purchase to  the  irradiated sandwich. Our estimates 
suggest no one who was originally purchasing the irradiated sandwich would switch to 
the  non-irradiated sandwich when only pro-irradiation information was disseminated. 
In  a market  without competing  information, pro-irradiation information influences con- 
sumer decisions. 
'  Recall, this must hold from the viewpoint of the party providing the information. If information consumers received were 
viewed by this party as  "misinformation," however, a consumer could have a nonnegative surplus. 
'The minimum a consumer could bid for the irradiated sandwich was zero (i.e., consumers' bids were censored). Consumers 
who preferred the non-irradiated sandwich were not able to fully express their WTP for the irradiated sandwich. We use a 
tobit model to account for this design feature in the "results" section when estimating the value of information for those who 
would switch to the non-irradiated food product. A non-censored model is used to estimate the value of  information for 
consumers who would switch to the irradiated sandwich because their bids were not censored. 
While previous experiments assessing the value of information (Rousu et al., 2004;  Huffman et al., 2003)  could estimate 
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Table 1. Percentage of Consumers Who  Would Switch Purchases, and the 
Value of Information 
PANEL A. Consumer Reaction to Pro-irradiation Information (N  = 18) 
Number of  Percentage of 
Description  Participants  Participants 
Buy irradiated sandwich before information  7  39% 
Buy irradiated sandwich after information  10  56% 
Switched to irradiated sandwich after information  3  17% 
Switched to non-irradiated sandwich after information  0  0% 
Value of information per person who switches to irradiated sandwich  $0.65** 
Average value of information for all participants  $0.11** 
PANEL B. Consumer Reaction to Anti-irradiation Information (N  = 19) 
Number of  Percentage of 
Description  Participants  Participants 
Buy irradiated sandwich before information  5  26% 
Buy irradiated sandwich after information  1  5% 
Switched to irradiated sandwich after information  0  0% 
Switched to non-irradiated sandwich after information  4  2  1% 
Value of information per person who switches to irradiated sandwich  $1.80*** 
Average value of information for all participants  $0.38*** 
PANEL C. Consumer Reaction to Both Pro-irradiation  and Anti-irradiation  Information (N=  50) 
Description 
Number of  Percentage of 
Participants  Participants 
Buy irradiated sandwich before information  19  38%" 
Buy irradiated sandwich after information  9  18% 
Switched to irradiated sandwich after information  0  0% 
Switched to non-irradiated sandwich after information  10  20% 
Value of information per person who switches to irradiated sandwich  $0.60** " 
Average value of information for all participants  $0.12** 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*I denote statistical significance at the 101,  5%,  and 1%  levels, respectively, 
using a chi-squared test. 
"We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the percentage of  participants who  switch and the value to participants is 
identical in panels B and C. 
Panel A also shows the value of  pro-irradiation information to these consumers. An 
individual who would switch purchases would gain a value of  $0.65 per sandwich from 
the pro-irradiation information. The average per person value of  pro-irradiation scien- 
tific information is $0.11 per sandwich. These values are statistically significant at  the 
5% level using a chi-squared test. 
Panel B of  table 1  shows the participants who received only anti-irradiation 
information submitted bids that revealed greater reluctance to purchase the 
irradiated sandwich. It is estimated that 21% of participants would switch to the non- 
irradiated sandwich in this treatment, leaving only 5% of  participants who would 
purchase the  irradiated sandwich after receiving anti-irradiation information. While the Rousu and Shogren  Valuing Conflicting  Public Information  649 
anti-irradiation (panel  B)  information is  found to influence a similar percentage of parti- 
cipants to switch purchases compared to the  pro-irradiation information (panel  A), those 
who would switch after reading the anti-irradiation information find it more valuable. 
The participants who would switch purchases after receiving anti-irradiation scientific 
information obtain avalue of $1.80 per sandwich from the information, and the average 
per person value of anti-irradiation scientific information is $0.38 per sandwich. These 
value estimates are statistically significant at  the 1%  level. 
Similar to pro-irradiation information, when presented in a vacuum, anti-irradiation 
information influences consumer purchases in the expected direction. Further, both of 
these information sources have value in the sense that if the information is accurate 
(which each scientific body believes to be so when they present this information), the 
consumers who change their behavior are  better off after receiving the information (the 
others have no change in utility). Next, we consider the value when consumers receive 
both pro- and anti-irradiation information. 
The Value of Conflicting Information 
When parties with opposing viewpoints present information on a novel technology, con- 
sumers' preferences could move either toward or against the irradiated sandwich. Some 
consumers could be more inclined to purchase the irradiated sandwich, others less 
inclined. Panel C of  table 1  shows the percentage of  participants who would switch 
purchases when they simultaneously receive both pro-irradiation and anti-irradiation 
information. An estimated 20% of participants would switch their purchase from the 
irradiated to the non-irradiated sandwich after receiving both pro- and anti-irradiation 
information. This percentage is similar to the percentage that  received only anti-irradi- 
ation information (panel B). No participants would switch to the irradiated product. 
While the percentage of participants who would switch to the non-irradiated sand- 
wich is similar, the value of  anti-irradiation information is affected by the existence of 
pro-irradiation information. A consumer who would switch gains a value of  approxi- 
mately $0.60 from the anti-irradiation information. This is far less than the $1.80 per 
person value for anti-irradiation information when presented in a va~uum.~  We  also 
observe the average value of the anti-irradiation information dropped by 68%-to  $0.12 
from $0.38 per person.1° 
Why  Does Information Influence Consumers to Switch Purchases? 
As shown by table 1, information can have value to consumers by causing some con- 
sumers to switch purchases. Either pro- or anti-irradiation information from scientists 
Recall that the value of information was estimated using different estimates for the premium for the irradiated sandwich. 
The value of  pro-irradiation information when presented  alone varies between $0.08 and $0.14 per person; the value of 
anti-irradiation information when presented  alone varies between $0.26 and $0.54 per person, while the value of  anti- 
irradiation information when pro-irradiation is also presented varies between $0.07 and $0.18 per person. Details of these 
results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
lo A reviewer pointed out that most value-of-information research assumes only one "most-informed"  state and compares 
everything to that state. Given this experimental design, the most-informed state is the state in which participants receive 
both pro- and anti-irradiation  information. The Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002) experimental design did not consider 
treatments in which participants first bid based on one source of  information (either pro- or anti-irradiation) and then bid 
again after  being exposed to both sources of information. Therefore, this type of analysis is  impossible given the experimental 
design, and remains an interesting area for future research. 650  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Probit Model Examining the Probability Participants 
Would Switch to Non-irradiated Foods if They Received Anti- 
irradiation Information (N  = 69) 
Regression  Regression 
Coefficient  (1)  (2) 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote statistical significance at  the 10%  and 5% levels, 
respectively, using a two-sided chi-squared test. 
would cause consumers to switch purchases and  hadvalue to consumers when presented 
without the competing viewpoint. When presented with competing information, the 
anti-irradiation information resonated with consumers, although the value consumers 
received from this information was reduced when competing information was intro- 
duced. 
We now probe further by examining what characteristics cause consumers to switch 
to non-irradiated foods if they received anti-irradiation information. A probit model was 
run to examine this issue, with the dependent variable in the model equal to 1  if the 
consumer switched to non-irradiated foods, and 0 otherwise. The following covariates 
are considered: AGE, CONCERN (about the safety of  the food they purchase as 
indicated in a pre-experiment survey), GENDER, EDUCATION, INCOME, and PRO- 
IRRADIATION (i.e., the consumer also received the pro-irradiation information). 
Appendix table A1 reports the socioeconomic statistics of these covariates, as  provided 
in Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002). 
Table 2 shows those who were concerned about the safety of their food were more 
likely to switch to the non-irradiated product after receiving anti-irradiation informa- 
tion. Faced with different types of risk (risk offoodborne illness or risk of adverse effects 
from irradiation), consumers chose the more familiar risk. This finding is consistent 
with the status quo effect, in which participants are more likely to choose the status quo 
alternative when faced with alternative risky choices (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). Individuals with more education were less likely to switch to the non-irradiated 
product; apparently they placed less weight on the anti-irradiation information and 
more on their prior knowledge. As income increased,  some evidence is found that 
participants were more likely to switch to the non-irradiated product, although this Rousu and Shogren  Valuing Conflicting Public Information  65 1 
result is only marginally significant (two-sided  p-value = 0.1). We find no evidence to 
suggest that gender or age affects the consumer's propensity to switch to the non- 
irradiated version of  the sandwich. This finding contrasts with results reported by 
Cameron (2005) who found both gender and age affected the weight people placed on 
new information. 
Concluding Comments 
Data from the experimental auctions detailed in Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002), and 
Hayes, Fox, and Shogren (2002)  are  used to estimate the  value of conflicting  information 
provided by two competing groups. The groups disseminate information hoping it has 
value whereby it  will induce consumers to change purchasing decisions. For pro-irradi- 
ation groups, information has value if it  causes consumers to switch to irradiated foods; 
for anti-irradiation groups,  value exists if consumers switch to non-irradiated foods. The 
results suggest each information set has value when presented in isolation. When both 
information sets are  presented together, however, only the anti-irradiation information 
has  value, although this value is diminished by nearly two-thirds relative to when it  was 
presented in isolation. Whether these findings are case-specific or represent a more 
general pattern for other controversial goods is unknown. Future research on this topic 
is warranted. 
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Appendix 
Table Al. Summary of Socioeconomic Data 
Variable  Definition 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation  Median 
GENDER  1  if male  0.33  0.49  0.49 
AGE  Categorical:  5.82  2.83  6 
1=<20  4 = 30-34  7 = 45-49 
2 = 20-24  5 = 35-39  8=>49 
3 = 25-29  6 = 40-44 
EDUCATION  Categorical:  5.53  1.62  5 
1  = Grade 8  6 = B.S., B.A. 
2 = Grade 9-11  7 = Some grad work 
3 = HS graduate  8 = M.S., M.A. 
4 = Some techltrade school  9 = Ph.D., M.D., etc. 
5 = Some collegdno degree 
INCOME  Categorical:  3.94  1.77  4 
1  = < $10,000  5 = $40,000-$50,000 
2 = $10,000-$20,000  6 = $50,000-$70,000 
3 = $20,000-$30,000  7 = $70,000-$100,000 
4 = $30,000-$40,000  8 = > $100,000 
PRIOR  Attitude toward food irradiation prior to the  0.08  0.55  0 
ATTITUDE  experiment: 
1  = Positive (n = 17) 
2 = Neutral (n = 60) 
3 = Negative (n = 10) 
Source: Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002). 